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Moral Dilemmas and Collective Responsibilities 
 
ABSTRACT: 
In this paper, I work within Ruth Marcus’s account of the source of moral dilemmas and 
articulate the implications of her theory for collective responsibility.  As an extension to 
Marcus’s work, I explore what her account means for the moral emotions and responsibilities of 
those complicit in perpetuating unjust systems of a non-ideal world from which moral dilemmas 
arise.  This move necessitates shifting away from the primacy of control.  That one is born into 
unjust systems one had no hand in establishing does not excuse one from responsibility to mend 
them.  Similarly, even if one’s personal contribution in the perpetuation of unjust systems is 
negligible – the injustices would continue whether one participated or not, and one’s resistance 
would do little-to-nothing – one nevertheless retains responsibility.  This expanded sense of 
responsibility necessitates a specialized sort of moral emotion – one that, like agent-regret or 
tragic-remorse, transcends the criterion of agentic control, but nevertheless can be classified 
neither as agent-regret nor tragic-remorse. 
_____________________ 
 
I. Introduction 
The moral dilemmas literature raises an important challenge to what has been a dominant 
tendency in modern normative ethics, namely, the tendency to reduce ethics to its ability to 
provide guidance towards moral cleanliness.1  The assumption that an agent always has a moral 
option available, in the sense of an action that will not constitute wrongdoing,2 is thrown into 
doubt: if moral dilemmas are real – if people can do their best and, through no weakness of will, 
ignorance, or vice, still do something wrong – it seems that there is something deeply inadequate 
with an exclusive focus on action-guidance for ethics.  If normative ethics is regarded as useful 
only insofar as it provides action-guidance, normative ethics will prove inadequate in the real 
world.  Those in the pro-dilemma camp, then, simultaneously assert the existence of dilemmas3 
and expand the terrain of moral consideration from the mere concern with action-guidance to the 
additional concern of act-evaluation (and/or, in some cases, agent-evaluation).  However, insofar 
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as the moral dilemmas literature focuses on actions of individuals, I contend, advocates on both 
sides of the moral dilemmas debate continue to rely on a reduced scope of moral concern.  From 
Socrates’ crazed friend asking for the return of his weaponry, to Sophie’s forced choice to 
abandon one of her two children, the classic examples focus primarily on the individual who 
finds herself within a dilemma.  Even if (as the pro-dilemma theorists state) there is nothing the 
agent can do to prevent doing wrong, thus breaking with one tendency in modern ethics, the 
arguments still focus on the individuals and not the contexts in which the dilemmas arise.  The 
ethical evaluations are of Socrates and Sophie, not cultures of violence or dehumanizing 
totalitarian regimes or, more to my point, the individuals living within these corrupt social 
systems.  In order to more fully expand the scope of a utilitarian-deontological moral tradition, 
and hence find a useful place for ethics within a non-ideal world in which inescapable moral 
wrongdoing regularly exists, one must open up the scope of the moral dilemmas debate to take 
into account collective responsibility for collective harms. 
In this paper, I intend to work within Ruth Marcus’s account of the source of moral 
dilemmas and articulate the implications of her theory for collective responsibility.  Marcus’s 
work is pivotal in presenting the implications of moral dilemmas for ethical theory; one of these 
implications, moreover, suggests the need for collective action in alleviating the conditions that 
produce moral dilemmas.  Nonetheless, Marcus’s interpretation falls back on individualistic 
attributions of responsibility.  Her work is worth critical attention, then, not only for its central 
role in the moral dilemmas literature, but also, as I will stress, for its demonstration of the way in 
which a theorist – even a theorist sensitive to harms caused by, and practically addressed only 
through, collective effort – can falsely be lured into placing emphasis on the individual rather 
than the collective.  
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I will follow Marcus as she describes moral dilemmas as arising within non-ideal 
contexts and signaling the need to alter institutional structures.  However, I will object to her 
account on the grounds of its individualistic focus.4  By centering on the responsibilities and 
moral emotions of the individual agent left to deal with the moral conflicts arising from a non-
ideal world, Marcus overburdens her agent with the responsibility for the proposed worldly re-
arrangement.  As an extension to Marcus’ work, I aim to explore what her account may mean for 
the moral emotions and responsibilities of those who are complicit in perpetuating unjust 
systems of a non-ideal world from which moral dilemmas arise.  This move necessitates a shift 
away from the primacy of control.  The fact that one is born into unjust systems that one had no 
hand in establishing, I shall argue, does not excuse one from responsibility to mend them.  
Similarly, even if one’s personal contribution in the perpetuation of an unjust system may be 
negligible – the injustices would continue whether one participated or not, and one’s resistance 
would do little-to-nothing – one nevertheless retains responsibility.  This expanded sense of 
responsibility also, I contend, necessitates a specialized sort of moral emotion – one that, like 
agent-regret or tragic-remorse, transcends the criterion of agentic control, but that nevertheless 
can be classified neither as agent-regret nor as tragic-remorse.  
 
II. A Summary of Marcus: Consistency and Irresolvability 
 
 Marcus’s aim is two-fold: to show both that moral dilemmas do not imply the 
inconsistency of a set of principles, and that consistency does not imply resolvability.  The latter 
point entails that moral “residue,” manifested in the form of a negative self-evaluative emotion, 
is an appropriate reaction for an actor in a dilemmatic situation. 
The perceived inconsistency that some theorists attribute to moral dilemmas, Marcus 
claims, rests on an overly stringent requirement for consistency.  The requirement is that a set of 
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moral principles must be applicable without conflict to any actual (or perhaps possible) 
situation.5  These theorists would say that moral dilemmas are only apparent, and indicate only a 
flaw in the set of principles the actor is considering.  Should the actor more clearly understand 
the moral code, the right path of action would be found and the “dilemma” would disappear.  To 
be faced with two conflicting obligations is to neglect a weighting principle, for example, or a 
qualifying phrase that would make one or the other obligation emerge as the more compelling.6  
The trouble with these approaches, Marcus argues, is that they each assume that dilemmas result 
from the inconsistency of principles themselves.  This assumption is faulty: even if there were 
only one principle (e.g., always keep one’s promises), it would still potentially produce moral 
conflicts (e.g., when one’s appointments unintentionally and unpredictably overlap) due to 
worldly contingencies. 
In contrast to the above definition of consistency, Marcus proposes that one “can define a 
set of rules as consistent if there is some possible world in which they are all obeyable in all 
circumstances in that world.”7  So long as a set of principles are logically consistent – each 
member of the set can be simultaneously true – the set is consistent, regardless of whether the 
members of the set are simultaneously true in every possible situation.  Marcus illustrates her 
definition with a card game.  She invents a set of consistent rules: black trumps red, high trumps 
low.  These rules do not logically contradict, and so can be played out in a deck stacked in a way 
conducive to the rules – that is, a deck in which a higher red card will never be paired against a 
lower black card.  In an un-stacked deck, of course, the rules will most likely come into conflict.  
The anti-dilemma theories above may be appropriate in the context of this card game: there is 
nothing wrong with tossing out the rules or trying a new set; they were silly rules anyway.  There 
are compelling reasons, however to keep moral rules.  Not only do we want them to guide us (as 
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the rules of a card game would), but we also want them to guide us in the right way.  Our 
principles, we believe, illuminate what is right, and as such they are intrinsically valuable and 
should be realized as often as possible.  This observation gives rise to a second-order regulative 
principle: our task “as moral agents, individually and collectively, as contrasted with the card-
game players, is to try to stack the deck so that dilemmas do not arise.”8  It is not a matter of 
tweaking principles so that we can live more easily by them; it’s a matter of arranging our world 
so that the principles (valuable in themselves) can more easily be met.  Insofar as we are 
“rational agents with some control of our lives and institutions,”9 we have a responsibility – 
Marcus explicitly recognizes, individually and collectively – to foster social arrangements 
conducive towards the moral goods that principles represent. 
It is this account of ethical consistency that gives rise to the moral residue of dilemmas.  
Because moral principles are in themselves valuable, that is, they are valuable apart from their 
action-guidingness, one would be mistaken to say that once an actor in a moral dilemma has 
acted she has also determined the correct principle, eliminating the value of the non-action-
guiding principle.  Both principles remain important, and this is the source of Marcus’s residue.  
The “ought” not acted upon (in Bernard Williams’ words) becomes an unfulfilled obligation.  
The actor’s failure to fulfill an obligation, like any actor’s failure, is the cause of the actor’s 
responsibility to make amends.  That the wrongdoing happened to occur in a particular 
(dilemmatic) context does not justify its being left unaccounted for; the person harmed by the 
wrong is still entitled to, at the very least, an explanation, and more of course depending on the 
extent of the harm.  The dilemma may be resolved, in that the agent has selected a preferable 
option, but the agent’s choice and action is not the end of the story of moral obligation.10 
 
III. A Criticism: Psychological Guilt and Individualism 
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So far so good.  Principles are not only guides for actions, but are also indications of what 
is right.  Because principles have worth independent of their action-guidingness we would like 
ideally, as a moral community, for all principles to be upheld in all circumstances.  Even without 
the expectation that we could realize an ideal world, we may still work towards that end; and so 
there is, Marcus argues, reason to try to design a world where moral principles do not conflict – 
on a collective, and not merely individual, level. 
Moreover, the supra-action-guiding value of principles indicates the source of moral 
residue.  When obligations conflict, neither one of them should be merely discarded.  To borrow 
an example from Michael Stocker, it would be strange to say that a person owing money to two 
persons, but only able to pay back one lender, therefore has no obligation to pay back the other.11  
The non-action-guiding “ought” remains.  The “remainder” (or residue) apportions a continuing 
responsibility to the agent for the aftermath of her harmful actions.  The continuing responsibility 
ensures that there is need for clean up, even after unavoidable mistakes. 
 Marcus has, then, substantiated the existence of residue – moral dilemmas produce 
continuing harms that need to be accounted for.  Marcus has also suggested that there is 
collective responsibility to ensure that moral dilemmas, given their harmfulness, do not crop up.  
However, Marcus does not follow through on this ascription of responsibility, as shown in her 
discussion of guilt as a motivator. 
 “Dilemmas,” Marcus argues, “when they occur, are data of a kind.  They are to be taken 
into account in the future conduct of our lives.  If we are to avoid dilemmas we must be 
motivated to do so.  In the absence of associated feelings, motivation to stack the deck, to 
arrange our lives and institutions so as to minimize or avoid dilemma is tempered or blunted.”12  
This quote contains two claims: (1) dilemmas serve as important data – they signal that 
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conditions are non-ideal.  We need not adjust our principles; we need to adjust the non-ideal 
conditions that gave rise to the dilemmas.  (2) In order to do this, we need proper motivation.  
Simply dispassionately observing that two principles conflict would not be sufficient – one must 
feel their conflict.  Without the pain of moral dilemmas, Marcus implies, we would never notice 
that something was awry, nor be motivated to make change.  In effect, however, Marcus limits 
this capacity to notice and be motivated to the individual actor within a moral dilemma affected 
by guilt.  Marcus describes a moral agent who does wrong simpliciter and, after realizing the act 
is wrong, intends to not repeat the wrong in the future.  She applies the same picture to the agent 
in the moral dilemma – she has still done wrong (unavoidably or not), and for that, is motivated 
to not act so again. 
“Most important, an agent in a predicament of conflict will also ‘wish to act properly in 
the future and strive to modify his actions accordingly.’ He will strive to arrange his own 
life and encourage social arrangements that would prevent, to the extent that it is 
possible, future conflicts from arising.  To deny the appropriateness or correctness of  
ascriptions of guilt is to weaken the impulse to make such arrangements.”13 
 
In the first, simple case of wrongdoing, the wrongdoer will simply resolve to act better.  In the 
second case, however, because the wrong occurred due to a moral dilemma – which in turn 
occurred because of improper social arrangements – the only way for the agent to not do wrong 
in the future is to re-arrange the social institutions that caused the conflict.  But in both the 
simple and dilemmatic cases of wrongdoing, only the individual actor is affected and hence is 
motivated to make amends. 
 Read at this individualistic level, Marcus’s second-order principle seems largely 
misplaced.  To be fair, the second-order principle may give some prudent guidance to an 
individual actor, depending on the situation.  This is why, for example, people with wood-based 
heating systems stockpile firewood in the fall: so that there will be enough wood to last through 
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the winter without having to make tough decisions between which rooms should be heated.  
There is no harm in giving advice that one ought to try to look ahead.  But, in cases where moral 
dilemmas are the result not of foreseeable natural hazards but of social systems, the individualist 
focus of the second-order principle is both inappropriate and ineffective.  It is inappropriate in 
that an actor in a moral dilemma should not be held solely responsible for a wrong that is also 
brought about by collective forces.  Such a narrow understanding of responsibility would only 
point towards misleading guidance – if Sophie’s dilemma is seen as her own responsibility to 
prevent, for example, one might say, perhaps, that she ought not to have had more than one child.  
The second-order principle not only inappropriately burdens the actor in this way; it is also 
ineffective.  If one overlooks the larger forces that shape an actor’s circumstances, and the 
collective responsibility for them, the institutional change needed to prevent dilemmas will never 
occur. 
 
IV. An Addendum to Marcus: Existential Guilt and Collective Responsibility 
Let us return to Marcus’s claim that moral dilemmas arise out of the external conditions 
of non-ideal worlds.  From this, Marcus derives a second-order principle to “stack the deck” 
towards ideal conditions.  The motivation to fulfill this second-order principle, however, ends up 
applying only to individuals acting within dilemmatic circumstances, and not to the collective 
members of the systems that shaped them.  This is because Marcus derives her account of 
motivation from an overly subjective model of guilt, wherein guilt is understood as an internal 
experience brought on by an actor’s recognition of her wrongdoing.  “Guilt” is limited to those 
who “do” wrong and know they do wrong.  In contrast, Sandra Bartky offers an “existential” 
version of guilt: “On my view, I am guilty by virtue of simply being who and what I am: a white 
woman, born into an aspiring middle-class family in a racist and class-ridden society.”14  
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Bartky’s guilt does not depend on her actions or her feelings; she would be complicit in a racist, 
classist society regardless of what she did or how she felt about it.  “I am making the 
counterintuitive claims that one can be guilty without having done anything wrong and that one 
can be guilty without feeling guilty.  I am guilty by virtue of my relationship to wrongdoing, a 
relationship that I did not create but have not severed either.”15  Social systems are not self-
perpetuating, but are, rather, intricately formed by the participants within them.  If moral 
dilemmas arise from social systems, as Marcus claims, then guilt should not be limited to 
individuals within moral dilemmas, but should extend in an existential sense to anyone complicit 
in those social systems.  Complicity need not imply intentional action; with Bartky, I understand 
complicity to include unintentional sustaining of an unjust social totality.  In this sense, 
complicity stems from individuals’ connections to systems that unjustly distribute privileges and 
burdens, and is often performed through everyday, unnoticed actions. 
The differentiation of Marcus’s psychological form of guilt from Bartky’s existential one 
accords with Karl Jaspers’ differentiation between “moral” and “metaphysical” guilt.  Jaspers 
describes the former: “I, who cannot act otherwise than as an individual, am morally responsible 
for all my deeds, including the execution of political and military orders.”16  This sense of guilt, 
like Marcus’s, implies one’s causal role in bringing about a particular deed, mitigating 
circumstances notwithstanding.  Jaspers defines metaphysical guilt, on the other hand, as: 
“the lack of absolute solidarity with the human being as such – an indelible claim beyond 
morally meaningful duty.  This solidarity is violated by my presence at a wrong or a 
crime.  It is not enough that I cautiously risk my life to prevent it; if it happens, and if I 
was there, and if I survive where the other is killed, I know from a voice within myself: I 
am guilty of being still alive.”17 
Jaspers here importantly emphasizes that guilt of the metaphysical sort exists, not primarily due 
to one’s actions, but out of one’s “presence.” Even without the violation of a moral principle, as 
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moral guilt requires, an actor can be metaphysically guilty.  Moreover, though an actor may be 
“especially” implicated by wrongs she is aware of, knowledge of them is not necessary for an 
actor to be metaphysically guilty of them.  “There exists a solidarity among men as human 
beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, 
especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge.  If I fail to do whatever I 
can to prevent them, I too am guilty.”18  One’s co-responsibility with large-scale wrongs derives 
from one’s association with collectives, even collectives so broad as to encompass “the human 
being as such.”19  Whereas moral guilt is dependent on what one does, metaphysical guilt refers 
to what one is. 
 Under the conception of existential or metaphysical guilt, one can be guilty for 
complicity in unjust social systems without direct, individual action.  Social actors outside of an 
immediate moral dilemma, then, can be guilty of violating Marcus’s second-order principle 
through their associations with the systems producing such dilemmas.  Marcus does not address 
the aftermath of having broken the second-order principle, but if she is consistent with her 
definition of guilt (viz., as moral), one would expect the violator to recognize her violation of 
obligation and have a concomitant motivation to make amends – to keep trying to alter her life 
and institutions.  My concern with this notion of guilt, however, is that often individuals do not 
feel in this way, particularly when they participate in the unjust social systems the second-order 
principle obligates them to adjust.  Peggy McIntosh expresses the lack of recognition that comes 
from privilege: “I think whites are carefully taught not to recognize white privilege, as males are 
taught not to recognize male privilege.  So I have begun in an untutored way to ask what it is like 
to have white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing 
in each day, but about which I was ‘meant’ to remain oblivious.”20  If motivation to fix 
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institutional structures is left to those who recognize their violations of principles – those who 
acknowledge a causal connection with wrongdoing – as Marcus’s guilt implies, systems that 
simultaneously cloak their injustices will not be affected by the second-order principle’s call for 
institutional change. 
 If we conceptualize the guilt of complicity in unjust systems not as a moral guilt, as 
Marcus suggests, but as an existential/metaphysical guilt as Bartky and Jaspers propose, we can 
articulate a broader sense of moral responsibility, one that does not derive from an actor’s 
recognition of her violation of a principle.  However, this shift from moral to metaphysical guilt 
causes a break in Marcus’s connection between the feeling of guilt and the motivation to make 
amends.  Guilt, in Marcus’s sense, serves an instrumental purpose: “[w]hen plagued by feelings 
of guilt… a person wishes to act properly in the future and strives to modify his conduct 
accordingly.”21  Metaphysical guilt, however, need not come attached to any feelings or 
recognitions of wrongdoing.  A particular feeling of guilt would be legitimate – “if a person feels 
guilty because her or his location in the social totality has been a source of unearned privilege… 
that person is, so to speak, ‘entitled’ to her guilt”22 – but the guilt in another, metaphysical sense 
already exists.  If we replace Marcus’s moral guilt with a metaphysical guilt, guilt need not be 
attached to a particular action nor to its attendant feelings. 
It is important, then, to introduce a new obligation that will ensure that one take 
responsibility for wrongdoing: one ought to feel guilty about one’s complicity in unjust systems.  
Larry May’s interpretation of Jaspers’ existentialist ethics phrases the obligation thus:  “one is 
always morally responsible for who one chooses to be, that is, for choices of attitude, disposition, 
and character, as well as for one’s behavior… The discussion [of Jaspers’ metaphysical guilt] 
reveals that people should strive to understand who they are and to approach the self with a 
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strong enough attitude of accountability to take necessary steps to change themselves for the 
better whenever possible.”23  For the existentialist, persons’ identities are crucially formed within 
group association; their choices in the groups they associate with, and/or their responses to the 
groups, constitute persons’ metaphysical guilt.24  Though moral guilt, for Jaspers, applies only to 
what one does, metaphysical guilt applies to who one chooses to be.  In this way, metaphysical 
guilt does involve a moral obligation – the obligation to readjust who one is.  This obligation, 
furthermore, cannot be accomplished while remaining on an individualistic level.  As Bartky has 
argued elsewhere, self-transformation cannot be understood as a sheer act of will.25  Personal 
transformation is not a matter of isolated determination, but is instead crucially influenced by 
larger, social forces.  Insofar as one’s self is not a matter of individual discretion, but is instead at 
least partly a result of the systems one associates with, self-transformation entails efforts within 
and in relation to collectives.  
 Bartky’s account of existential guilt similarly includes a call for critical assessment of 
one’s position in the world.  “So far, my analysis suggests that privileged people in general are 
not innocent of injustice; nevertheless, only a fraction recognize this to be the case.… [W]e need 
to imagine, in the most vivid sense, what it would be like to be one of the insulted and injured of 
this world, for the insults and injuries of others, when we open ourselves up to them as best we 
can, are indeed not easy to bear.”26  In the absence of a direct connection between personal 
wrongdoing and moral guilt (with its contained self-evaluation), it becomes a moral duty to self-
reflect.  One should feel guilty.  In Marcus’s case, the moral responsibility is to make amends for 
the personal violation of a principle, which in effect means altering corrupt social institutions.  In 
Bartky’s and Jaspers’ analysis, however, the moral responsibility is to become the sort of person 
who cares to make such alterations; this work of self-transformation is not voluntaristic, but must 
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instead be achieved on the collective levels that critically inform one’s sense of self.  Marcus’s, 
Bartky’s, and Jaspers’ approaches each emphasize the need for changes on an institutional level, 
but Bartky’s and Jaspers’ demand the responsibilities of a much wider range of persons, and not 
only those who directly, individually violate moral principles. 
 
V. Objection: Doesn’t “Ought” Imply “Can”? 
There may seem to be something strange about assigning guilt – even if renamed 
“metaphysical” – to persons based on the harms that their social system may produce.  Surely 
persons do not create their institutions – they are, rather, born into them.  To say that someone is 
“guilty” for their happenstance social location is akin to saying she “ought not” to have been so 
located or else that she ought to remove herself.  Both directives would be manifestly impossible. 
This objection, however, identifies as primary moral elements one’s purposeful actions 
and intentions, while ignoring unpredictable outcomes.  In other words, it depends on the control 
condition: “that people cannot be morally assessed for what is due to factors beyond their 
control.”27  The control condition, Margaret Walker argues, is neither a condition we accept in 
our ordinary moral lives, nor one that we ought to.  To take an example from Bernard Williams, 
suppose a “lorry driver” unintentionally kills a child who darted into his path; that the driver 
“shrug it off” would strike us as quite impermissible.28  Correlating control with responsibility 
too closely would preclude the need for integrity.29  Instead of justifiably abandoning moral 
harms that were not sufficiently of one’s own doing, a person of integrity would rise to the 
occasion and accept her part towards eliminating harms that she did not intentionally create. 
There seems to be another violation of “ought” implies “can” at work in the preceding 
sections, however.  Suppose it is acceptable to say that a person in an unjust system is in some 
sense guilty; is it appropriate to suggest that this person should adjust her emotions to become 
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more sensitive and to thereby feel her own guilt?  Can we really reconfigure ourselves in this 
way? 
 Alison Jaggar makes the case that one’s emotions are not, contra traditional philosophical 
discourse, wholly out of one’s control.  Emotions are not merely physical sensations that sweep 
over one, and they are not completely divorced from reason.  Anyone who has taken a deep 
breath and counted to ten has realized the control one can enact over one’s emotional reactions.  
Over time, one can retrain oneself to respond differently to various situations, as any proper 
behavior modificationist would maintain.  “Perhaps it is more helpful to think of emotions as 
habitual responses that we may have more or less difficulty in breaking,”30 rather than as purely 
involuntary.31  If this is the case, and emotions are partially under cognitive control, it does not 
seem so unreasonable to hold people responsible for them. 
 Proposing a responsibility that a moral actor has to alter her attitude, then, shouldn’t be 
seen as a flat-out rejection of “ought implies can.”  But it does demand a different sense of what 
an actor can be seen as responsible for than is typically held by theorists subscribing to the 
control condition.  The actor is responsible for her apathy, as opposed to her actions.  This apathy 
is not merely the result of one’s being born into a system of privilege that precludes one’s 
immediate notice of injustices.  It is also a result of an actor’s choices.  Interpreting Jaspers, May 
claims that “metaphysical guilt is not merely based on group membership.  Rather, it arises out 
of the fact that a person did not but could have (and should have) responded differently when 
faced with the harms committed by his or her follow group members.”32  One may not be able to 
choose one’s associations – with the middle-class in a capitalist system, with white people in a 
racist culture, and so on – but one does have the option at least of disapproving and working 
against the harms perpetuated by those associations.  There is still an element of control at stake, 
15 
 
but the control one has is over one’s position towards a group’s wrongdoing and not precisely 
one’s own, and so still constitutes an expansion of what a moral agent can traditionally be 
thought to have responsibility for. 
 
VI. A Concession to the Objection: Rethinking Guilt 
 The worry about assigning guilt to agents who have done their personal best, yet 
nevertheless remain complicit in less-than-ideal systems, has some merits.  When I initially 
objected to Marcus’s individualism, I charged that her guilt was overburdening to the actor in a 
dilemmatic situation – the individual could have no hope of ever attaining what her second-order 
principle tells her to do on her own.  Likewise, it would seem, the metaphysically/existentially 
guilty person would seem beleaguered by guilt in this account.  Suppose that she has become 
cognizant of systemic injustices and her role within them; she is in a position where she 
recognizes her obligation to adjust social institutions.  So long as the institutions go unadjusted, 
this person continues to leave her “ought” unfulfilled and thus violate an obligation.  Though I 
have expanded the range of people who suffer Marcus’s guilt, thus taking away the criticism that 
only a few individuals (rather than a collective) are burdened with the responsibility to alter 
institutions, it is still admittedly unlikely that a collective will realize an ideal institution.  What 
sort of “guilt” is appropriate to ascribe to these well-intentioned individuals in the meanwhile? 
 The notion that guilt is necessarily overburdening is one that derives, again, from a 
narrow conception of control.  Traditional deontological-utilitarian theories make room for two 
moral emotions: regret and remorse.  The former corresponds to unfortunate events – events that 
were out of one’s control.  The latter applies to cases where an agent recognizes that she 
committed a moral violation, and that this violation was within the agent’s control.33  It seems 
that if I want to retain some sense of control for agents, I need to place them in the remorse 
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camp.  To put them in the regret camp would be to neglect their role in perpetuating unjust 
systems – the very role that I have argued that agents should recognize – and also of any 
accountability for moral clean-up.  An appropriate phrase accompanying a feeling of regret may 
be, “oh well,” or “what a shame” – clearly improper reactions if an agent is to maintain some 
sense of responsibility and motivation to work towards improvement.  How, then, to maintain 
motivation to make amends for harms, without implying an agent’s complete control over the 
actions that produced those harms? 
 De Wijze summarizes Bernard Williams’ “agent-regret.”  This form of regret “factors 
into our emotional responses our role in bringing about certain states of affairs albeit 
unintentionally.  Unlike regret, agent-regret can only be felt by a person ‘towards his own past 
actions (or, at most, actions in which he regards himself as participant).’”34  To return to the 
example of the lorry driver, it seems the driver should express regret, and a concomitant desire to 
make amends, even without his intentional action bringing the event about.  It seems “agent-
regret” may be suited to cases where an agent recognizes her complicity in unjust institutions.  
That the agent is complicit is out of her control; she was born into her position and is merely 
working within the already established system.  However, agent-regret does not provide an 
“adequate vehicle for the agent’s state of mind, one which feels the moral pollution from 
deliberately violating a cherished moral precept and the disgust and disquiet given her causal role 
in the furthering an immoral project (albeit the lesser one) of others.”35  Driving an ill-fated lorry 
is not entirely like complicity in an unjust system: the lorry driver, who did not drive unsafely, 
knows that he could not have foreseen or avoided hitting the child and need not work towards 
any change in his behavior or system.  The child was simply dropped into his path.  As 
previously stated, however, agents in social systems are not completely devoid of causal roles.  
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Systems are not self-perpetuating, and resistance towards such perpetuation is possible.  
Moreover, the lorry driver is involved in a harmful act, but does not contribute to a system in 
which such acts continue; the child’s darting out was accidental, and there is no need for the 
agent to desire change at a systemic level.  Agent-regret does not take into account either the 
metaphysically guilty agent’s sense of causality or her perpetuation of an ongoing system of 
wrongs. 
 De Wijze has an alternate suggestion for cases in which an agent becomes complicit in 
such immoral projects.  “Tragic-remorse captures this cost of violating both a cherished moral 
value and being part of the causal process of furthering the immoral projects of others.”36  The 
“remorse” of the term refers to an agent’s participation in immorality, whereas “tragic” qualifies 
the immorality and takes into consideration the inescapability of the participation.37  In this way, 
there is a stronger sense of an agent’s causal role in the moral harm of the event, without 
implying her intention to cause such harm.  As in the lorry case, cause is distinguished from 
intent; but in instances of tragic-remorse, the agent’s causal role extends past an immediate 
action and implicates the agent in greater systemic wrongs.  In some respects, this description 
may seem to fit with the situation of an actor complicit in unjust institutions.  Unlike in cases of 
agent-regret, in tragic-remorse “part of the moral phenomenology is that we learn something 
from these situations and about ourselves; we discover what we have become by so acting.”38  
One becomes “morally polluted”39 – recognition of this moral cost is what prompts an agent to 
not only regret the event and her role in it (as in agent-regret), but also to take action to change 
herself and her systems.  In other respects, however, tragic-remorse seems not quite accurate for 
the metaphysically guilty actor.  De Wijze created the term to apply to “dirty hands” cases, 
wherein “the immoral projects of others leaves choices only between bad or evil options.”40  In 
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choosing the lesser of two evils, an agent furthers an immoral project, but purely out of moral 
considerations.  The intent of the agent is to do good, which justifies the agent’s action in some 
way: the actor should on some level feel “pride and relief.”41  The actor does not think that she 
should have acted differently – “no reform of the agent’s character or behavior is necessary; on 
the contrary, she is to be admired.”42  Actors guilty of complicity in unjust systems, however, are 
not always entitled to justification – their participation is inevitable, but there is not necessarily 
any moral imperative to participate, and as such, they may lack this recourse to admirability.  It 
is the recognition of this very lack of admirability that motivates the actors to change themselves 
through disapproval and further resistance towards their systems. 
 None of the proposed concepts for appropriate moral emotions, then, fully describe the 
metaphysically guilty actor I have been describing.  The emotional state of the metaphysically 
guilty actor is more focused on the individual’s sense of self than agent-regret entails, and may 
lack the recourse to admirability guaranteed to the actor of tragic-remorse.  Metaphysical guilt 
implies a distinct emotional term.  Whatever this term, however, the comparison of metaphysical 
guilt to agent-regret and tragic-remorse should make it clear that the ascription of metaphysical 
guilt need not be considered overburdening.  Though it does not let its actor off the hook, as the 
traditional denotation of “regret” would, it also does not impart to the actor a sense of her solitary 
cause of wrongdoing, as traditional “remorse” would.  The worry that an account of 
metaphysical guilt is overly demanding can thus be at least somewhat diffused by considering 
the range of meanings for guilt outside of the conventional confines of control. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Marcus begins an insightful discussion of responsibilities of a community to eliminate 
injustices derived from its operations.  Her account in itself is too individualistic; however, 
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replacing her concept of moral guilt with metaphysical guilt helps to sustain her call for 
collective responsibility.  The introduction of “metaphysical guilt” requires, if not an outright 
rejection, a significant softening of “ought implies can” and the control condition.  Another 
question may be raised at this point: if there is metaphysical guilt, what can one do to resolve it?  
Is it possible for one to not be guilty, to remove one’s complicity?  I cannot answer this question.  
I agree with Bartky, that worries “over degrees of complicity… can become… a backhanded 
way of keeping ourselves still in the center.”43  In a world with pervasive dirt, the chief concern 
should not be with one’s own moral cleanliness, but rather, with what one can do to better the 
situation.   The moral dilemma debates help with this discussion, insofar as they examine one’s 
responsibilities even for wrongs that were in some way inescapable.  In order to more broadly 
expand responsibilities, though, we need to notice that it is not only on individual levels that 
wrongs are committed, but also collective levels.  We should not only ask what one can do as an 
individual to clean up in the aftermath of actions that were out of one’s control, but also what 
one can do as a member of a collective for actions outside of any individualistic control. 
Jessica B. Payson 
Binghamton University 
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